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<CN>6 
<CT>Peace for Whom? 
<CS>Legacies of Gender-Based Violence in Peru 
<CA>Jelke Boesten 
 
<TXT>In August 2016, a multitude of women, their families, and 
their friends took to the streets of Lima to protest the high 
levels of violence against women in Peru and the impunity 
routinely accorded to the perpetrators of this violence. Never 
before had so many Peruvians protested violence against women, 
even if there had been ample reason to do so. In this chapter, I 
will explore why this mass mobilization happened at that 
particular point in time by examining the extent to which the 
violence against women in 2016 might be interpreted as a legacy 
of the violence of the Internal Armed Conflict (IAC), or as a 
result of persistent historical structures of violence and 
inequality. I also consider whether the contemporary response to 
such violence from both civil society activists and the state 
should be seen in light of the continuous battles over truth, 
justice, and reconciliation. 
 In exploring the hypothesis that the contemporary violence 
against women is a legacy of a much longer history of violence 
and inequality, I will focus in particular on what aspects might 
be seen as a sequel to the Internal Armed Conflict. I will ask 
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if high levels of peacetime violence might be seen as either a 
wartime mechanism or a post-conflict legacy. To examine this, I 
draw from my research in the archives of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and other sources for my book Sexual 
Violence during War and Peace: Gender, Power, and Post-Conflict 
Justice in Peru (2014). But I am also interested in exploring 
how the lack of justice and visibility regarding cases of 
conflict-related violence against women contrasts with the more 
recent mobilization of hundreds of thousands of people to 
protest against continuous high levels of violence against 
women. I argue that perhaps historic cases are too politically 
and socially divisive to work as examples that promote broader 
gender justice;instead, it may be that the struggle against the 
everyday violence women and girls experience across lines of 
class, ethnicity, geography, and age has finally found its 
historic momentum, with capable activists to lead the way and a 
political opportunity to rise to the challenge of demanding 
justice and social change. 
 
<A>High Levels of Violence against Women as Sequel and Continuum 
 
<TXT>As is now widely known but not necessarily widely accepted 
in and beyond Peru, gender-based violence was an important 
dimension of the political violence that enveloped Peru in the 
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1980s and 1990s. Gender-based and sexual violence, understood as 
violence perpetrated for specifically gendered reasons (i.e., 
because of being a woman, or because of being queer, or 
employing sexual violence), was used by all the armed groups 
involved in the IAC: Shining Path, MRTA, the Peruvian military, 
and indeed the peasant self-defense forces. It is slowly coming 
to light that the MRTA, and possibly the Shining Path as well, 
targeted queer men and women in the Loreto region (CVR 2003a, 
2:432–433). In addition, the Shining Path stands accused of mass 
enslavement of the Ashaninka people of the Amazon, including 
sexually enslaving Ashaninka women and girls (CVR 2003a, vol. 
5). The use of different forms of gender-based violence within 
the Shining Path still requires research, as there is evidence 
of forced marriages, rape, and infanticide (CVR 2003a, vol. 6). 
These incidences of gender-based violence are all expressions of 
male dominance in precarious and contested spaces. 
 Most notable is the use of sexual violence on the part of 
the Peruvian military against civilians as well as people 
suspected of terrorism. This topic is comparatively well 
researched (Henriquez and Mantilla 2003; Henriquez 2006; Boesten 
2014a). Drawing on testimonies of witnesses, perpetrators, and 
survivors of sexual violence, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, or CVR) 
found that sexual violence was widespread and even 
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systematically used against populations suspected of terrorism, 
as well as against civilians (CVR 2003a, vol. 6). The CVR 
documented 538 cases of rape in which the victim-survivor could 
be identified by name and surname, but estimated that this 
represented only 7 percent of actual cases of rape. The victim 
profile of this violence reflects geographical, ethnic, class, 
age, and gender divides: young, rural, and indigenous women were 
most vulnerable to sexual violence and abuse. But this was not 
the only vulnerable group: according to the CVR, 80 percent of 
women imprisoned in Lima experienced sexual assault and abuse 
from security personnel, and 25 percent were raped. 
 Based on the data, the CVR concluded that members of the 
police and armed forces were the main perpetrators of systematic 
rape. While we must recognize the need for further research on 
the use and practice of gender-based violence by all armed 
groups in the conflict, it is worth noting that state forces 
were the main perpetrators of such violence. This is especially 
important because it is the state’s function to provide security 
for its citizens,  because it points to the state as a major 
agent in reinforcing and reproducing existing inequalities, and 
finally, as will be discussed later, because none of the 
perpetrators of such violence have been held to account. The 
data confirms that gender-based violence is highly political, 
not only in war, but also in peacetime. 
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 The patterns of rape perpetrated by state forces reflect 
the widespread idea that rape is used as a weapon of war. The 
military used sexual torture in its prisons and rural military 
bases, raped women and girls during raids in homes and villages 
as a means to terrorize the population, and used women and girls 
as booty and as tools for a politics of divide-and-rule between 
communities as well as to establish and maintain hierarchies 
between soldiers (Henriquez 2006; Boesten 2014a). Hence rape was 
used, albeit not formally, as “part of a systematic political 
campaign with military purposes,” that is, as a weapon of war 
(Skjelsbæk 2010). 
 It is difficult to establish whether soldiers were ordered 
to rape prisoners or civilians, and it is unlikely that evidence 
of such orders will ever be found. As I have argued  (Boesten 
2014a), testimonies of victim-survivors and others suggest that 
specific military masculinities, which rely heavily on 
performances of heteronormative dominance and the use of extreme 
violence and sexual violence as social capital within military 
hierarchies, facilitate the widespread practice of sexual 
violence. For example, hierarchies between more and less 
available women based on perceptions of race and class--a 
hierarchy of sexual availability which draws strongly on 
existing societal stratifications--was used to establish and 
reproduce hierarchies between soldiers. According to testimonies 
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from soldiers, young poor indigenous women were available to be 
raped by the troops, even if they were “just” community members, 
civilians, and not suspected of any political activity. But 
women who were captured on suspicion of terrorism and who were 
seen as whiter or better educated than the cholitas from the 
village would first be raped by the commander in charge. The men 
highest in rank could choose among the prisoners, and could even 
choose to keep women and “enamorarlas” (seduce them) for longer 
periods of time. Such abusive behavior from military officers 
clearly encourages the rank and file to do the same. 
 There are further indications that sexual violence against 
local women and girls was turned into a practice that created 
social capital within the armed forces: girls were ordered to 
come to military bases and prostitute themselves during parties, 
girls were forced to negotiate with soldiers about the 
conditions of their abuse, such as whether they would be raped 
by one or two soldiers rather than gang raped, or the reward for 
being abused, such as receiving information about loved ones. In 
such ways, sexual dominance over local girls may have given 
these soldiers certain masculine credibility in the eyes of 
their peers and, especially, their superiors. There is evidence 
of soldiers boasting to each other about their conquests and 
their violence; there is evidence of collective pornographic 
spectacles in which soldiers violently gang raped girls and 
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women, dead or alive, watching each other and spurring each 
other on (Boesten 2014a, 19–42). Such experiences suggest a 
process of drawing soldiers into a spiral of brutalization 
(Mitton 2015), using the most “obvious” victims--the most 
vulnerable to abuse--as a tool. From such a perspective, the 
sexual abuse of women served as a means not only to terrorize, 
fragment, and dominate the rural population or the prison 
population, but also to foment a loyal army of young men willing 
and able to continue to perpetrate atrocities. 
 The idea that gender-based violence during the conflict 
reflects the patterns of inequality that existed before and 
after the war is important: it suggests that such violence is an 
exacerbation of existing relationships. The abuse of women 
during the war may have been extremely cruel and very 
widespread, but at the same time, such violence was imaginable, 
possible, and scripted along lines of existing violence and 
inequalities. This means that some women are more vulnerable 
than others to harassment by men in public spaces, or in the 
workplace, because of vectors of inequality such as 
race/ethnicity, class, and age. But all women are vulnerable to 
gender-based violence in their own homes. 
 There is no data concerning levels of violence against 
women before the 1980s, but women reported to the CVR that 
during the conflict the armed forces were not the only 
304 
	
perpetrators of violence against them. Henriquez and Mantilla 
(2003) show how violence against women in their own homes and 
communities often escalated in zones with high levels of 
political conflict. We do not know whether that is caused by a 
breakdown of social order, opportunism, or the frustration and 
traumatic context in which families were forced to live. What we 
do know is that most men and women in the highly affected areas 
were compromised by the violence, either through victimization 
or recruitment by the Shining Path, the self-defense forces, or 
the armed forces (Theidon 2012). If we add that fact to the idea 
of what armed groups do to the young men and women who become 
involved in the conflict, including the possibility of 
brutalization among those forced into spirals of violence, then 
perhaps the rise of domestic violence in a context of 
participation in political violence is not surprising.1 Following 
the analytical framework set out by Soifer and Vergara in the 
Introduction to this volume, the high levels of gender-based and 
family violence in areas most affected by the armed conflict of 
the 1980s and early 1990s could be called a “wartime mechanism.” 
However, despite the lack of verifiable statistics, violence 
against women, including sexual violence, also seems to have 
been high before the armed conflict. 
 Violence against women in wartime is not the same as 
violence against women during peacetime, but there certainly is 
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a continuum. The difference lies in the extreme cruelty and 
frequency of wartime violence, as well as the drawing in of 
those who might otherwise not have become victims or 
perpetrators of gender-based violence. But there are also 
similarities: in wartime and peacetime, women and girls 
perceived as being of lesser value because of race and class--
often determined by criteria such as citizenship status (does 
she have papers?), poverty, geography, language, education, 
dress and physical aspects  such as height, color of eyes, and 
type of hair--are more vulnerable to rape. Young women perceived 
as being cholas--of indigenous descent--who work in wealthier 
households are historically perceived as legitimate targets for 
men’s sexual satisfaction (Boesten 2012). Likewise, young women, 
or rather, adolescent girls--the main victims of soldiers’ 
sexual abuse--are also the main victims of contemporary 
peacetime sexual abuse (Mujica 2011). 
 The scale of peacetime violence should also be taken into 
consideration: according to data from the Programa Integral de 
la Lucha Contra la Violencia Familiar y Sexual in Ayacucho 
(2005), physical violence against children is common, and sexual 
violence against children rampant (see also: Boesten 2010, 148). 
Current figures of violence against women collected by the 
National Bureau of Statistics through a household survey method 
show that in 2014, 32.3 percent of women experienced physical 
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violence perpetrated by their intimate partner at least once in 
their lifetime, 7.9 percent experienced sexual violence, and a 
staggering 72.4 percent experienced psychological and/or verbal 
violence, often in addition to other forms of violence (ENDES 
2014). A study that looked at police statistics and data from 
women’s emergency centers (one-stop multisectoral centers set up 
in the 1990s to report abuse and seek support) and the Ministry 
of Women and Social Development for the years 2000 to 2009 
concluded that on average, about 7,000 cases of sexual violence 
were reported each year to such institutions. However, in 2009 
the Institute of Forensic Medicine alone carried out 34,153 
exams of “sexual integrity,” examinations of women and girls who 
reported sexual abuse but whose claims were not entered into the 
statistics of the police, emergency centers, or the ministry. 
Seventy-eight percent of the formally reported denunciations 
concerned girls eighteen years old or younger. Of these, 10 
percent concerned children aged nine and under; 25 percent 
involved children aged ten to thirteen; and 45 percent 
represented adolescents aged fourteen to seventeen (Mujica 
2011). Wartime mechanism or not, these are extraordinary figures 
which raise the question of whether peacetime is truly peaceful 
for women and girls. 
 One conclusion could be that a high rate of post-conflict 
violence against women is a consequence of conflict-related 
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violence. Epidemiologists agree that a range of factors 
contribute to high levels of interpersonal violence, 
particularly sexual and gender-based violence, which tend to be 
more prevalent in post-conflict societies. These factors include 
high levels of trauma among both men and women, alcoholism and 
drug use, violence against children in their homes, and the 
prevalence of “toxic” masculinities (Gould and Jewkes 2013; 
Guedes et al. 2016). In Peru, NGOs, civil society organizations, 
and state institutions such as Women’s Emergency Centers in 
Ayacucho cite trauma and alcohol and drug use as strongly 
affecting levels of violence against women and children (Boesten 
2014a, 127). Violence against children as a form of disciplining 
them, i.e., as communication, was also reported to be high 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (Boesten 2010, 148). 
According to the National Household Survey from 2014 (ENDES 
2014), 25 to 29 percent of parents still use corporal punishment 
with their children. But the practice of corporal punishment  
(and the effects it may cause) is more likely attributable to 
historical-cultural factors rather than political violence. 
 The idea of “toxic” masculinities--understandings of 
manhood as necessarily violent, controlling, and 
(hetero)sexually predatory--has gained traction among feminist 
researchers and epidemiologists. The prevalence of toxic 
masculinities is often associated with histories of violence and 
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exclusion. For example, South African scholar Pumla Dineo Gqola 
(2015) asserts that a history of violence, dispossession, and 
exclusion experienced by large parts of that nation’s population 
has created a situation in which asserting dominant 
masculinities could become a form of resistance against the 
violence of the system, as well as the preferred form in which 
the dominant group asserted its power within its own group and 
against the marginalized population. Other scholars, such as 
Chris Dolan (2003), who examines masculinities in post-conflict 
Uganda, or Kimberly Theidon (2009), who looks at men’s 
reintegration in Colombia, suggest that the undermining of men’s 
roles as breadwinners and heads of households has created a 
masculine crisis often compensated for through violent and 
controlling behavior, especially against more vulnerable groups 
such as women. These studies all indicate that the social, 
political, and economic history of post-conflict societies 
shapes social relationships, and the prevalence of sexual and 
gender-based violence, in the present. Thus high levels of 
gender-based violence could be seen as a post-conflict legacy. 
 But in Peru, a complex historical dynamic of violence 
against and dispossession of the indigenous population forms the 
background to continuing high levels of gender-based violence. 
In patriarchal societies, women have long been subordinated to 
men, with certain male privileges--including the right to rape 
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one’s wife--enshrined in law until fairly recently. Furthermore, 
in postcolonial societies, whiter men’s dominance over 
indigenous people continues to shape women’s vulnerability to 
racialized and sexualized violence in their homes, communities, 
and places of work. Peruvian literature is littered with 
narratives of the abuse of chola domestic servants, largely 
perceived as legitimate sexual targets for coming-of-age of 
adolescent boys and as legitimate targets for men in venting 
their sexual frustration. The vulnerability of this group of 
women was recently attested to by Obdulia Guevara Neyra, the 
general secretary of the Union of Domestic Workers-Lima 
(SINTTRAHOL), who claims that 60 percent of domestic workers 
today experience some form of sexual abuse.2 The experience of 
gender-based violence, then, runs along a continuum from cat-
calling to emotional, physical, and sexual violence in homes, 
communities, and workplaces, and to rape and femicide in war and 
peacetime. The continuum also runs through history, from 
colonial times to modern Peru. Perpetrators may be powerful men 
who feel entitled to women’s bodies of all colors, or they may 
be subaltern men who feel entitled to women and girls still more 
vulnerable than themselves. An authoritarian political culture 
grounded in patriarchal and racist relationships across society 
fuels these toxic masculinities and perpetuates the 
vulnerability of women and girls. 
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 Thus, it is fair to say that the widespread sexual violence 
during the Internal Armed Conflict in Peru showed parallels to 
sexual violence in peacetime. Wartime rape worked as a means to 
reproduce and perpetuate existing historical inequalities based 
on gender, race, class, age, and sexuality. Contemporary 
peacetime sexual violence does so as well, but in a less obvious 
and more privatized manner. Post-conflict societies such as 
Peru, but also Guatemala or South Africa, show high levels of 
interpersonal violence, including sexual violence, and this is 
certainly related to the wartime history of violence and 
conflict. But while high levels of peacetime violence are not 
necessarily a direct sequel to a particular conflict (although 
it will be present in specific communities or families), we 
should recognize the broader role and function of gender-based 
violence, and particularly of sexual violence, in reproducing 
structures of inequality in war and in peace, before, during, 
and after armed conflict. In this light, the idea of gender-
based violence as a wartime mechanism or post-conflict legacy is 
difficult to sustain. 
 Explicit efforts to reach reconciliation and justice among 
former enemies make post-conflict eras an important opportunity 
to address historical hierarchies such as those associated with 
ongoing sexual violence. Transitional justice could, and should, 
transform the social relations that feed into violence, 
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providing the state and society a chance to address gender 
inequality and violence associated with it. In that sense, the 
way in which the state and society deal with conflict-related 
sexual violence in the post-conflict moment could start a 
process of positive change for women and men. The CVR did the 
best it could in the limited time it had to uncover the truth 
about the systematic perpetration of sexual violence by all 
armed groups. Likewise, the institution tasked with documenting 
victims of violence, the Registro Único de Víctimas, did an 
important job in recording cases of sexual and gendered 
violence. Thus, the information needed to build a policy of 
accountability exists, and it is the responsibility of the state 
to acknowledge and account for what was done in its name. A 
formal apology on the part of the state, the military, and the 
police to all women and men harmed by the sexual violence would 
send a powerful message heralding a new era in which gender-
based violence is no longer acceptable, and paving the way for 
effective judicial and policy interventions to address wartime 
victimization as well as continuing widespread violence in 
contemporary Peru. Unfortunately, this has not happened; 
perpetrators of sexual violence still evade punishment, and 
patriarchy is alive and well. 
 
<A>Patriarchy and Impunity 
312 
	
 
<TXT>The protests of August 2016 in Peru were triggered because 
men continue, with impunity, to inflict violence on women. 
Criminal justice may not solve the root causes of gender-based 
violence, but the problem will certainly persist if perpetrators 
are consistently getting away with violence and abuse. Two 
particular cases of unpunished violence against women entered 
the public consciousness in July 2016.In both cases, the courts 
decided to give the perpetrators suspended sentences after 
deciding the forensic evidence suggested the harm done was 
“minor.” In the first case, in Ayacucho, a woman named Cindy 
Contreras was assaulted by her boyfriend, who beat her up when 
she tried to flee the hotel where he had taken her. In a video 
that was widely circulated on the Internet, footage from 
security cameras showed the boyfriend, Adriano Pozo, naked, 
dragging Contreras by her hair through the reception area. Pozo 
was captured and put on trial, but a judge gave him a suspended 
sentence and a fine, arguing that the nature of Contreras’s 
wounds suggested that he had not intended to rape or kill her, 
but had only inflicted minor harm.3 The sentencing judge, a 
woman, was an acquaintance of Pozo’s father, an Ayacuchano 
governor. 
 The second case was that of Lady Guillén, a celebrity in 
the world of Cumbia, who endured assaults by her boyfriend for a 
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year before reporting the violence when she felt her life was in 
danger. Photos of her beaten, disfigured face, with stitches 
around her eyes, were widely circulated in newspapers since 
2012. But in 2016, the judge in the case considered Guillen’s 
wounds minor, and decided, that her life had not been in danger.4 
The aggressor, Ronny García, received a suspended sentence after 
having spent several years in pretrial imprisonment. Released, 
García now stands accussed of violence by a new girlfriend.  
These two emblematic and well-publicized cases were matched by 
similar cases throughout the country. Women and girls were 
disfigured, raped, and killed by their partners or former 
partners, and their cases were reported in small corners of the 
printed media, but justice was generally not done. The massive 
protests of 2016, never seen before in the history of activism 
against gender-based violence in Peru, led to new investigations 
of the Contreras and Guillen cases, but many other cases have 
yet to receive the attention they merit. 
 As I have detailed elsewhere (Boesten 2012; Boesten 2014a), 
impunity for violence against women is generally high in Peru. 
Despite the presence of well-established laws and protocols, 
there are multiple problems in the Peruvian state’s response to 
sexual violence. A lack of training in gender awareness and 
recognition of sexual violence continues to debilitate the 
police, judiciary, and forensic medicine services designed to 
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support battered women. A lack of adequate funding for services 
that work, or should work, such as women’s police stations and 
emergency centers, undermines the promise these services embody. 
A lack of political collaboration among the district and 
municipal authorities who are in charge of allocating funding to 
some of these services further impedes them, while the lack of a 
sufficiently independent and effective judiciary constrains 
gender justice. Overall, the dissonance between a relatively 
good legal and policy framework on the one hand and weak 
implementation on the other stems from the unresolved tension 
between a patriarchal state which puts the male-headed family at 
the center of all considerations, and the need for a policy that 
treats women’s rights as inalienable. 
 As in many parts of Latin America, the role of a 
conservative Catholic Church is particularly harmful in Peru. 
The progressive Liberation Theology that emerged in the late 
1960s largely disappeared with the demise of the Left in the 
1990s, and as Vergara and Encinas show in chapter 9 of this 
volume, the more conservative sectors of the Church gained a 
more central presence. Opus Dei, led by Cardinal Luis Cipriani, 
archbishop of Lima, is now the dominant Christian voice and 
holds tremendous power over politics and institutions, 
particularly with regard to gender politics. Recently, in 
response to campaigns for the decriminalization of abortion in 
315 
	
cases of rape, as well as in response to the demonstrations of 
August 2016, Cipriani has spoken out against what he calls the 
danger of the “gender ideology,” wielding his influence to 
denounce campaigns that could unsettle the Church’s patriarchal 
power. While it is difficult to sustain a position that endorses 
violence--indeed, a whole range of agencies, state institutions, 
and businesses supported the August 2016 March against gender-
based violence--it appeared possible to defend heteronormativity 
and the “sanctity of life” by accusing women and girls of 
provoking sexual harassment and even rape.5 Hence, patriarchy is 
not the archaic concept that it should be by now, but rather, 
continues to build and rebuild its historic momentum. 
 The persistence of patriarchal relationships, underpinned 
by a normative belief in a natural gender inequality, stands in 
contrast with the increasing number of women in higher 
education, in formal employment, and in national and local 
politics. Whereas many scholars judge women’s representation in 
national politics during the 1990s as affirming gender 
stereotypes rather than unsettling them (Blondet 2002; Schmidt 
2006; Boesten 2010), women’s participation has become 
consolidated since the start of the twenty-first century, if not 
without encountering resistance (Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016). 
In 2015–2016 we saw the rise of a new generation of left-of-
center female politicians: Verónika Mendoza stood for president 
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for the Frente Amplio, and Marisa Glave and Indira Huilca proved 
to be strong voices in Congress in support of human rights. 
Mendoza, Huilca, and Glave are unafraid to defend women’s rights 
and to discuss sexism in politics, representing a new feminist 
voice in national politics. Considering the increased prominence 
of women in public life and the gap in progressive politics that 
is now being filled by a new generation of feminist politicians 
and activists, perhaps the pushback from conservative sectors in 
society should be seen as a response to that increasing cry for 
gender equality. For example, the newly approved school 
curriculum for 2017, which includes gender equality as an 
objective, was considered to promote gender “ideology” and 
homosexuality, undermining the family as cornerstone of society 
according to conservative sectors,6 and was given as a reason to 
force the widely popular and acclaimed education minister Jaime 
Saavedra to resign in December 2016. 
 This tension between increasing gender equality on the one 
hand and persistent patriarchal attitudes in some institutions 
and sectors on the other hand is what allows for impunity from 
punishment for sexual violence to persist, but it also allows 
for protest, in Peru and indeed throughout Latin America. In 
Peru, this tension is also coming to the fore in relation to 
historic crimes against humanity, particularly regarding 
criminal justice in relation to sexual violence perpetrated by 
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the Peruvian military in the 1980s and truth finding and 
political accountability in the case of forced sterilizations in 
the 1990s. 
 
<A>Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation; or, Struggles over 
Legacies 
 
<TXT>When the CVR concluded that sexual violence in the Internal 
Armed Conflict had been systematic, particularly on the part of 
the armed forces, it also allowed for several cases to be 
identified and investigated more thoroughly in the interest of 
seeking criminal justice. By 2012, human rights organizations 
had investigated and presented sixteen cases to the public 
prosecutor. In Febrary 2018, three military were convicted to 
prison sentences for the kidnapping and rape of a student in 
1992. This first positive result is a landmark ruling, and may 
help the emblematic case that is currently on trial against 
eleven ex-military. This case, commonly known as Manta y Vilca 
after the two communities affected, concerns fourteen 
complainants.8 The hearings before the National Criminal Court 
started in July 2016 and could last for several years. 
 It has taken thirteen years since the publication of the 
CVR report for this case to come to court. There are several 
reasons for this slow process, and of course for the continuing 
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impunity in most other cases of conflict-related sexual 
violence. First, there is an overall reluctance to prosecute 
military officers for violations of human rights. The Peruvian 
military and police force commanded counterinsurgency efforts 
against two very destructive rebel groups, and for obvious 
reasons they do not like to be criticized for their actions. In 
addition, while the transitional government of President 
Valentín Paniagua in 2000–2001 purged the relevant institutions 
(military, National Intelligence Service, judiciary, and 
electoral committee) of corrupt and violent officials who had 
upheld the Fujimori regime (Taylor 2005), this did not prevent 
the election of Alan García or Ollanta Humala. García, in power 
from 2006 to 2011, was also the president in 1986 when the navy 
was sent in to suppress a prison uprising in El Frontón, where 
at least ninety senderistas were killed in extrajudicial 
executions. Ollanta Humala served in the military in the 1990s 
and was accused of being involved in human rights violations in 
Tingo María. Electoral support for García and Humala, as well as 
for Keiko Fujimori, the still-popular daughter of Alberto 
Fujimori, indicates that perhaps there simply is not much 
governmental or popular support for positions which seek to 
address the excesses of the counterinsurgency of the 1980s and 
1990s, including prosecution of former military figures for 
violations of human rights. 
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 Of course, the military and the Ministry of Defense also 
influence what is possible in terms of who can be prosecuted and 
who cannot, and of what evidence is available and what is not. 
As such, as soon as human rights organizations started to 
investigate specific cases of military rape based on CVR 
testimonies, the Ministry of Defense refused to release 
documents which could reveal the identity of specific soldiers 
in specific times and places. It claimed these particular 
archives had burned down. 
 Furthermore, a lack of resources and investigative capacity 
in human rights law impedes the adequate prosecution of cases of 
sexual violence. Cases of sexual violence are notoriously 
complex in any context; hence the relatively low conviction 
rates in most parts of the world. But the complexity of such 
cases is highly influenced by normative understandings of what 
rape is, who can be victimized, and who can be a perpetrator. 
Historically, rape in marriage has seldom been recognized, as 
husbands were accorded an unquestioned right to their wives’ 
bodies, and women were expected to acquiesce. Likewise, rape was 
often denied both by society as well as in the courts because of 
how women behaved, what they wore, where they went, or what they 
had done. Traditionally, the only prosecutable forms of rape— 
have been those involving a clearly innocent victim and a 
perpetrator who is a stranger to that victim (data shows, 
320 
	
however, that most sexual violence is perpetrated by people in 
relationships of trust with the victim). So gendered prejudices 
impede adequate prosecution. In Peru, the historical divisions 
along lines of race, class, and gender further constrain a more 
objective legal perspective upon cases of rape. This is 
widespread in “everyday” peacetime cases such as that of Lady 
Guillén and Cindy Contreras, as well as in cases of conflict-
related rape. For example, while international law says that in 
a context of war there cannot be a context of consent, in 
practice, the lines between consent and coercion seem just as 
porous as during peacetime: CVR interviews show how interviewers 
sometimes dismissed women’s claims of having been raped based on 
assumptions about the nature of consent, even in the overall 
violent context of war. Likewise, conceptions of what 
constitutes an injury, or of who speaks the “truth,” have been 
questioned by judges presiding over cases of state-perpetrated 
rape--even when the evidence is a child born in captivity. 
Prosecuting cases of conflict-related rape are difficult for the 
same reasons that human rights violations perpetrated by the 
military are difficult to prosecute, but in addition, the 
specific coordinates of sex crimes and the institutionally 
embedded prejudices based on race, class, and particularly 
gender further impede successful prosecution in Peru. 
 The successful prosecution in 2016 of two former military 
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officers in Guatemala for crimes against humanity, sexual 
violence, and domestic slavery perpetrated against indigenous 
women in the community of Sepur Zarco in the 1980s is 
groundbreaking because of this complexity. This success is now 
followed by the Manta y Vilca case considering crimes against 
humanity and sexual violence in 1980s highland Peru. Although 
Manta y Vilca might take years to resolve in court, that it has 
reached court in the first place is already an achievement. But 
however revolutionary the case might be, there is little public 
interest in Manta y Vilca, for all the reasons described 
previously. In addition, the victim-survivors, poor indigenous 
women of mature age, are not interesting to the wider public,nor 
are the perpetrators of much public interest as mestizo and 
cholo former soldiers living at the margins of contemporary 
society. 
 At the same time, there has been increasing pressure on the 
Peruvian government in recent years to investigate and account 
for forced sterilizations carried out in the mid-1990s by the 
Fujimori administration under the banner of the Programa 
Nacional de Planificación Familiar. The goal of this National 
Family Planning Program was to reduce population growth to 2 
percent by decreasing average fertility from 3.6 to 2.5 children 
per woman by 2000. One program objective was to improve maternal 
and child health, and the effort on the whole emphasized freedom 
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to choose, reproductive rights, and gender equality. In 
practice, however, rural physicians were given quotas to 
sterilize a certain number of women each month, and were 
promised improved working conditions and resources for their 
cooperation. Doctors who were uncooperative were threatened with 
negative consequences. According to various sources, many poor, 
largely indigenous women were sterilized, including between 600 
and 10,000 forcibly or against their will. Many more--up to 
300,000--were treated in unhygienic and unprofessional 
circumstances (CLADEM 1999; Congreso de la Republica 2002; MINSA 
2002; DEMUS 2008). 
 The developmental rationale for the program--to reduce 
population growth for the sake of economic stability--was based 
on the idea that one can reduce poverty by reducing the poor 
population. Misconceptions founded on sexism (only women are 
responsible for reproduction, and hence for poverty) and racism 
(indigenous women and men are too ignorant to control their own 
fertility even when given the right resources) among both those 
in command as well as those implementing the policy made 
coercion in the sterilization program possible (Boesten 2010). 
Several investigations have taken place since the coercive 
practices behind the sterilization program were uncovered 
(Congreso de la Republica 2002; MINSA 2002; DEMUS 2008) 
including one by the US Congress in 1998 to account for the role 
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of USAID funding for the program.9 However, to this day, no in-
depth research has documented the actual number of women 
affected, nor has any criminal investigation accounted for the 
actors involved. Research shows that local physicians and nurses 
had an important role to play in the program’s implementation 
(Boesten 2010; Gianella 2014);although it seems necessary to 
hold them accountable, it would be too easy to blame only some 
individual doctors. Rather, it is essential that those who 
designed and enforced the program be held to account for the 
harm they have done. Governmental responsibility for the 
violence perpetrated in its name is crucial if the objective is 
to break through the gendered and racialized structures of 
inequality. 
 After the first uncovering of the program by human rights 
activist Giulia Tamayo in 1997,10 the forced sterilization 
program at first drew the attention of only a relatively small 
group of academics and activists. The case revealed a series of 
tensions and contradictions in Peruvian society and its desire 
for change that are difficult to reconcile: progressive feminist 
ideas about equality and inclusivity clash with conservative and 
patriarchal ideas about women’s roles and their responsibility 
for reproduction. 
 Since 2012, a new generation of activists has worked to 
document and publicize forced sterilizations carried out by the 
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Family Planning Program, and to pressure the government into 
creating a register of victims that can be used in administering 
reparations, conducting an investigation into political 
accountability, and exploring criminal accountability (Ballón 
2014). Despite this heightened activism, the judiciary 
permanently closed the case in November 2016. 
 There are several ways of understanding the state’s lack of 
enthusiasm for addressing these historic abuses. First, and most 
importantly, both the sexual violence of the armed conflict as 
well as the forced sterilizations are representative of 
persistent inequalities grounded in ideas about race, class, and 
gender. Clearly, the racist connotations of the sexual violence 
meted out on the rural and prison population in the 1980s and 
1990s, and of the forced sterilizations of the late 1990s, have 
helped reproduce and further entrench those inequalities. Any 
transitional justice policy would have to address this in order 
to challenge these inequalities. While the report of the CVR 
certainly focused on these structural inequalities and the 
violence that it produced, it was not able to unsettle the 
narrative by drawing in new voices or significantly challenging 
existing hierarchies. Challenging structures of inequality 
grounded in entrenched prejudices perhaps requires new thinking 
and new actors on the political stage. The entrenchment of 
inequality means that indigenous women (and, arguably, most 
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indigenous men) simply do not have a voice in Peruvian society. 
Most claims that indigenous women want to make on the state, or 
on broader society, have to be channeled via urban activist 
networks and NGOs, which draws them into a whole different set 
of political struggles. 
 Another way of explaining the lack of enthusiasm for 
addressing the historic abuses is by placing them in the broader 
context of contemporary post-IAC battles over truth and justice. 
Transitional Peru is divided between those who view the conflict 
through a military-conservative perspective, and those who are 
grounded in a human rights perspective as laid out by the CVR’s 
final report (Drinot 2009). In regard to gender issues, the 
conservative-military perspective employs a patriarchal 
orientation akin to contemporary opposition to “gender ideology” 
as discussed previously. Human rights groups, in contrast, 
support gender equality and women’s rights. Human rights 
organizations also actively seek to provide a voice to those 
marginalized by the persistent inequalities in Peruvian society. 
For the victim-survivors of sexual violence at the military 
bases of Manta and Vilca, Huancavelica, as well as for those 
sterilized under the Fujimori regime, this means that their 
cases are channeled into the public sphere via vocal human 
rights groups such as APRODEH, IDL, COMISEDH, and DEMUS. This 
places victim-survivors and their legal cases in the middle of 
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the battles over truth and memory, between those who support a 
military-conservative narrative and those who favor a human 
rights perspective. But it is victim-survivors’ human rights 
that are at stake here. Their past, present, and future are 
largely lost in the struggles among urban elites over IAC 
legacies that Paulo Drinot describes in chapter 11. 
 
<A>Conclusion 
 
<TXT>In 2016, two emblematic historical cases of institutional 
sexual violence against women, one involving the systematic rape 
of women in rural Huancavelica, and the other the forced 
sterilization of poor rural women, could not get civil society 
to mobilize as effectively as could the two “everyday” cases of 
Lady Guillén and Cindy Contreras. While there are reasons to 
believe that high levels of contemporary violence against women 
are related to the long and complex history of institutionalized 
racism, sexism, and political violence, it is apparent that it 
will be difficult to use the post-conflict moment to unsettle 
the entrenched and intersecting inequalities that are the root 
of this violence. There is no clear causal relationship between 
conflict-related gender-based violence and peacetime levels of 
violence that can be quantified and made concrete. 
 Considering these constraints, how was it possible for 
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three women in July 2016 to mobilize fifty independent 
organizers in twenty-four hours, forty-five thousand 
collaborators and protesters in five days, and about half a 
million women, men, and children in time to march against 
gender-based violence on August 13? First, I believe that the 
three Ni Una Menos instigators managed to mobilize a cross-class 
alliance with women who did not have a history of activism or 
politics. This is unique, and was largely accomplished through 
social media, which does not discriminate (as much) as does 
word-of-mouth mobilization. The effective use of different 
Facebook pages as well as instant messaging had a democratizing 
effect upon the often-unequal relationship between civil society 
organizations or NGOs and grassroots groups. The Facebook page 
set up to serve as an organizational platform quickly turned 
into a platform for sharing painful memories, many of which had 
never been revealed before. The organizers respected this rain 
of testimonies and set up alternative social media tools to 
continue organizing the protest march. An open confessional 
space used by fifty thousand people is a conscience-raising 
forum beyond most feminists’ dreams, and it allowed for people 
to speak and participate who otherwise would have stayed 
invisible. The number and severity of the experiences shared on 
this page, as well as the speed at which they circulated, also 
drew in allies who are usually more difficult to mobilize for 
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cases of gender-based violence: men, private-sector participants 
such as business sponsors, and indeed even representatives of 
the state (the police, the judiciary, and the newly appointed 
president all made public statements and appearances as part of 
the protests). 
 The political moment was important: Keiko Fujimori, a 
symbol of a guilty and violent past, and arguably representing 
(or at least defending) the conservative-military historical 
perspective, lost the elections held in April 2016. Verónika 
Mendoza, a representative of a hopeful new left-wing alliance 
arguably championing a human rights historical perspective, also 
lost. The winner, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, if not a political 
outsider or a representative of a new generation, was chosen for 
his technical perspective, or, one could argue, for his seeming 
neutrality in long-standing political feuds. The Ni Una Menos 
campaign stepped into a  political vacuum in which progressive 
politics, as well as opposition to them, was in disarray. The 
first weeks of this new government was the perfect moment to 
mobilize the Peruvian population against something that often 
falls in the gaps between two highly divided political camps. 
 At the same, the Ni Una Menos campaign focused on ongoing 
everyday violence that women and girls experience regardless of 
their political, ethnic, geographical, or class origins. While 
this campaign was certainly supportive of emblematic historical 
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cases of sexual violence, these cases were not central to the Ni 
Una Menos narrative. Much of the transitional justice literature 
advocates for the post-conflict moment to be crucial in 
effecting transformational change. We hope that the shock of 
truth will lead to justice, and that criminal justice and 
reparation will lead to conciliation and transformation. But 
perhaps it is the other way around: first things need to change, 
and then perhaps there will be justice. 
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not often asked before more systematic monitoring of rates of 
violence against women began. Holly Porter found that a majority 
of raped women during the Ugandan internal conflict claimed to 
have been raped by intimate partners, not by active combatants 
(2015). 
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8 One more case is under investigation by the Interamerican 
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http://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/comunicaciones/notas-
informativas/cidh-admite-caso-emblematico-de-violacion-sexual-
ocurrido-durante-periodo-de-violencia/. 
9 The Peruvian Population Control Program Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, 105th 
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